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THE COAST GUARD AND NAVY
It’s Time for a “National Fleet”
Colin S. Gray
The U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy have been, are, and will remain com-plementary. They are not competitors. However, notwithstanding the dis-
tinctiveness of their missions and functions, in practice their duties overlap.
There is a zone of activity wherein the services share maritime geography and
foci of concern. Because the Coast Guard operates shallow-draft warships, it can
be misrepresented as the coastal or shallow-water navy of the United States.
Similarly, because the Navy supports the Coast Guard when necessary and feasi-
ble, perception of naval enthusiasm for such support (and beyond) can feed
ill-founded anxiety that the Coast Guard is in peril of imperial absorption by the
much larger service. A well-ordered U.S. defense community, confident in its
understanding of the emerging strategic environment and prepared to pay the
freight for national security, would provide little fuel for these essentially foolish
apprehensions. However, this article is propelled by
the appreciation that even though the Coast Guard
and the Navy are natural and necessary allies, trends
exist today—both internal to each service and, even
more, in their contexts of operation—that could
strain their relationship.
As we shall see, it is not surprising that most of
the sources of difficulty in the interservice rela-
tionship stem from questions about missions and
equipment pertaining to the Navy, rather than to the
Coast Guard. The latter does not face challenges to
its roles, missions, and relative importance that are
so radical as those that stalk the Navy. The Coast
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Guard, understandably, is occasionally anxious lest some of its duties be outsourced,
privatized, or picked up by a Navy looking for self-justifying tasks. However,
those periodic perils (real and imaginary) fade nearly into insignificance when
compared with the vulnerability of the Navy to shifts in defense-intellectual
fashion and foreign-policy mood. The Coast Guard’s potential (domestic) crit-
ics are largely toothless tigers; the Navy’s are not. The centerpiece of this discus-
sion, then, is the future relationship between the Navy and Coast Guard in light
of their common status as sea services of the United States, under the conceptual
umbrella of a “national fleet.”
That relationship cannot be considered in isolation, however. Both services
must shape their interconnection with reference to powerful contextual factors.
Whether or not Navy–Coast Guard relations constitute a love match, each needs
the other. Trends point with a uniform logic to the common sense contained in
the idea of a national fleet. What the Navy lacks by way of blue-water challenge
from a pressing “high end” threat finds ample compensation in opportunities
and problems posed by the emerging information-led revolution in warfare. An
unmistakable trend afflicting the all-high-end U.S. Navy is a declining number
of ships. Fleet size is not everything, but—as the last Chief of Naval Operations
reminded us—“numbers do matter.”1 Especially do numbers count when op-
erations of all kinds must be conducted worldwide by a rotational deployment
pattern.
Just as the Navy’s operational tempo has become unsustainably high for a
peacetime rotational fleet, so the Coast Guard is obliged to cope with a higher
demand for its services. The uses made of the sea, which taken all together con-
stitute the principal driver of Coast Guard activity, have risen, are rising, and are
projected to rise much farther yet. Quite aside from its national defense mission,
the Coast Guard has a basket of traditional duties, a collection expanding in va-
riety, quantity, and quality of challenge.
THE ARGUMENT
We will examine in some detail the current and anticipated conditions and cir-
cumstances of the Navy and the Coast Guard, and also the terms by which and
ways in which they can best complement each other. First, however, it is useful to
break the rules of dramatic construction and reveal the five points that, together,
represent the “argument” of this article. These points are not particularly re-
markable or even controversial (except for the fifth). Rather, as we will see after
setting the argument, actual and potential controversy on a major scale attaches
to the character of the “contexts” (political, military, intellectual-doctrinal, soci-
etal, and so forth) within which the services must operate over the decade ahead.
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For the Navy in particular, there is much scope for dispute as to the requirements
in military and strategic effect that U.S. foreign policy will place upon it.
First: The U.S. Navy needs to be all that it has to be as a war-fighting instrument.
Indeed, it is as the exemplar of naval prowess that the Navy supports the foreign
policy of the global superpower. Given that major naval combatants, with
midlife refits, may well be in com-
mission for thirty or forty years,
contemporary defense-intellectual
fashions and fads, even today’s
“best guesses” about the strategic
future, should be treated with
some reserve. Much as nominal, back-of-the-envelope answers to, say,
ballistic-missile-defense queries can always be manufactured promptly on
demand (how long does it take to produce a vugraph?), so high-end naval
power—in general and specifically—can quite easily be dismissed as yesterday’s
unaffordable and irrelevant answer to the bold novelties of tomorrow. The past
century has seen great combat fleets “sunk” virtually by torpedo-firing flotilla
craft, erased by airpower, sidelined or destroyed by nuclear menace, and now
relegated to deep-reserve status by “asymmetric” anti-access capabilities that
could, allegedly, lock out most of the U.S. Navy from an enemy’s maritime
approaches.
Let us note that in the twentieth century great navies survived strategic chal-
lenge from new classes of threats deriving from the subsurface, aerial, space, and
electronic environments. The smart money says that the U.S. Navy will be as suc-
cessful in the future as it was in the past at riding the erratic waves of revolutions
in military affairs, and that predictions of its imminent strategic relegation will
prove as ill judged in the future as before.2 Because “history is geography,” as
Jacob Burckhardt wrote with only modest exaggeration, the U.S. Navy cannot
responsibly be regarded as just one player on an infinitely fungible national se-
curity team.
Second: Insofar as practicable, the Navy should leave coast guarding to the Coast
Guard. If naval warships happen to be in the right place at the right time and
have no truly urgent and stressful national-defense missions to perform, then by
all means let them contribute to security at sea in its fullest and broadest sense.
However, just as the warships with orange and blue stripes can fight but are not
expected to excel in the conduct of naval warfare, so the gray hulls of the Navy
certainly can function as surrogate coast guard but are not expert in that role.
Moreover, as the Navy continues its up-market movement with acquisition of
supercapable and superexpensive destroyers and cruisers, so it will have ever
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fewer (leading to zero) relatively small and cheap general-purpose warships
(that is, frigates) appropriate for shallow-water duties short of naval war.
Given the authoritative status of the national fleet “treaty” of 21 September
1998 between the Navy and the Coast Guard, it is troubling to find that the Navy
Strategic Planning Guidance with Long Range Planning Objectives of April 2000 is
all but oblivious both of the Coast Guard’s skills and of the limitations of the
Navy itself.3 The NSPG sees no tension between arguing soundly that “insuffi-
cient numbers entail strategic risk as well as excessive personnel and operational
tempos” and reaching close to coast-guarding domain.4 Describing the “day-to-
day engagement” activities of the Navy, it argues that
this engagement process also encompasses the spectrum of military operations other
than war (MOOTW), which repeatedly employs naval forces in missions such as hu-
manitarian disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace sup-
port missions, enforcement of embargoes and no-fly zones, counterproliferation
measures, and rapid reaction to terrorism. Future forces also must be prepared to
support law enforcement agencies to deal effectively with non-military challenges to
our national security, such as illegal immigration, illegal drug trafficking, and other
international criminal activity.5
There are times when what U.S. policy most needs for its support is what
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., usefully terms “formidability—e.g., as manifest bigness,
obvious speed, devilish appearance, and demonstrated cunning.”6 However, as a
general rule, sending an Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer like the
USS Cole into the Arabian littoral is akin to “sending a man out to do a boy’s
job.”7 A U.S. Navy properly and jointly directed in strategic terms should focus
on the higher-risk tasks that fit logically and prudently with its trends in equip-
ment acquisition, leaving as many extramilitary maritime security tasks as pos-
sible to the Coast Guard.8 Of course the Navy could undertake many
coast-guarding jobs, and in many countries navies do just that (Britain’s Royal
Navy, for example).9 However, that has not been the American way, and given
the fact that the United States has the world’s best coast guard (as well as the
world’s best navy, by far), there is every reason for exploiting the duality of its sea
services.
Third: The national fleet treaty of 21 September 1998 is no more than common
sense. The “Treasury Fleet,” later the Coast Guard, has served in or with the U.S.
Navy in all of America’s wars that have had maritime dimensions. The concept
of a national fleet can raise paranoid fears in both services, but in fact it dignifies
what has been the American experience: the Navy and Coast Guard have fought
as a national fleet. The Navy’s anxiety that the Coast Guard would use the
national-fleet idea as a license to hunt for more missions, more force structure,
G R A Y 1 1 5
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and more money at the Navy’s expense is amply matched by Coast Guard
nervousness lest the national fleet should become a “bear hug,” extinguishing
organizational independence, even autonomy. Neither fear is well founded, but
both need exposure and recognition.
The fact of the matter is that on its current course regarding technical choices
and force structure, the U.S. Navy is opening more and more space between the
shallow-draft multimission warships that major Coast Guard
cutters are and its own newly “low end” destroyers (DDs) and
guided-missile destroyers (DDGs). Should the Navy, improbably,
elect to pursue variants of the STREETFIGHTER concept, then
indeed it would be back in the business of small (and more ex-
pendable) warships. At present, though, that point is strictly spec-
ulative. It is no stretch to reason that a navy acquiring DDG 51s
(Arleigh Burkes) and intending (and hoping) to buy DD 21s as the
low end of its fleet mix is likely to be size challenged. The concept, and one hopes
the practice, of the national fleet provides an important, actually essential, part
of the answer to the challenge of too few “frigates.”
Fourth: The Coast Guard should be recapitalized by rapid implementation of its
planned Integrated Deepwater System (IDS). For an acquisition cost in the range
of fifteen to twenty billion dollars over twenty years, the Coast Guard will re-
place and modernize with a new class of maritime security cutter, long-range
aircraft, and C4ISR.* This modernization is necessary to enable the service to
cope with the expanding demands of its maritime safety, environmental protec-
tion, and law enforcement roles, as well as its national defense duties.
Coast Guard maritime security cutters will not be frigates, but these catego-
ries of warship do bear more than a casual similarity. Writing at the end of the
Cold War, Eric Grove informed us that a frigate is a “combatant of about 1,750
to 3,000 tons usually optimized for ASW [antisubmarine warfare] but with gen-
eral purpose capability; essentially intended for the escort of noncombatant
shipping, although useful for patrol and limited offensive operations, capable of
oceangoing transits and tasks; usually air capable [operating helicopters].”10
Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigates (FFGs) displace around four
thousand tons and the Coast Guard’s Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters
(WHECs) about three thousand. That is to say, some Coast Guard cutters are
frigate-sized warships. They can be made as frigate-like as the Coast Guard
prefers, politically is permitted, and can be afforded. Looking to the future, how-
ever, when the Navy ceases to have FFGs in commission, no one will be in any
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danger whatsoever of mistaking a hull with an orange stripe—even one from the
top end of the catalog—for a nine-thousand-ton DDG.
Service sentiment aside, the national fleet of the United States needs some
more or less frigate-sized and modestly priced general-purpose warships. If
the Navy cannot afford to operate them, given the military logic of its
high-end-procurement strategy, it should be a cause for rejoicing that the Coast
Guard, prudently modernized, can take up some of the slack. If a modernized
Coast Guard is to complement the Navy in a national fleet—or simply in joint
warfare—it requires equipment that not only is complementary but can operate
seamlessly with that of the other armed services. Whether or not some in the
Navy regard the Coast Guard as a necessary evil (or regrettable necessity!), all
can agree that a modern Coast Guard, if it is to sail and fly on national-defense
duties, must not be a net liability to operational and tactical commanders. A
Coast Guard recapitalized by the IDS has to be able to function with the Navy as
a tactically and technically reliable team player, working by the same rules of
network-centricity.11 Needless to say, it comes down to money, doctrine, plan-
ning, and training.
Fifth: As an armed service, the Coast Guard probably should relocate to the De-
partment of Defense. There is no general law governing the proper character or
bureaucratic location of a coast guard. Each country does it its own way. More-
over, what arrangement is suitable may vary, depending upon trends in roles and
missions of both the service in question and host institutions. The U.S. Coast
Guard, consolidated as such in 1917, lived under the aegis of the Treasury De-
partment until 1967. Since then it has been a part of the extended empire of the
Department of Transportation. Cases can be made for “no change” (stay in
Transportation), some form of independent agency (the Federal Emergency
Management Agency?), a move to the Justice Department, or—as suggested
here—a move to Defense. There are problems with each alternative. Suffice it at
this point to argue that the military benefits that should flow from the Coast
Guard’s being fully recognized, and treated bureaucratically, as one of the five
armed services match trends in Coast Guard duties, facilitates the vital na-
tional-fleet concept/treaty/plan, and should promote vital commonalities in
C4ISR, inter alia. (An interesting case can be made for moving the service to the
Justice Department, but—considered overall—Coast Guard activities fit better
within the Defense Department, or DoD.) The challenge, of course, would be to
identify ways to reap the military benefits of Defense family membership while
retaining the distinctively law-enforcement and regulatory, civilian-lifeguard,
and resource-protecting character and ethos of this uniquely dual-focused
service.
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CONTEXTS
The future force structures of the Navy and the Coast Guard, and the terms and
conditions of their relationship, will be shaped vitally by the several contexts
that give them meaning. Four contexts dominate: domestic (resource), foreign,
military, and (nonnaval) maritime. The fourth, “(nonnaval) maritime,” refers to
a broad understanding of the uses of the sea; its inclusion here is essential, be-
cause it accommodates the many activities and trends by which are created pub-
lic demand for coast-guarding services. While the Navy and the Coast Guard are
complementary and can be fashioned at the margins so as to take cost-effective
account of each other’s assets, they are nonetheless driven by the beats of very
different drummers. At least forty or so of the world’s “navies” are really greater
or lesser coast guards, but that is not, and cannot be, the case for the global su-
perpower. In fact, as our argument explains, the military context for the U.S.
Navy is changing in ways that accelerate its distinctiveness from the Coast
Guard. This is not a criticism; it is just the way things are in the military realm at
the beginning of the new century.
We should note that our current strategic condition is not exactly the first
period in modern history when the greatest navy of the day had to cope with the
challenges of what became a long political peace (to borrow from Edward Gibbon)
and an accelerating technological revolution. C. J. Bartlett, in his now-classic
study of British sea power in the four decades from the fall of Napoleon to the
Crimean War, writes:
Many were the calls upon the [British] government after 1815 for cuts in official
spending, for tax concessions, and for money for other purposes. A weak ministry
would neglect such demands at its peril. Naval supremacy could not be sacrificed,
nor would the country have allowed such a thing, but many savings short of that
point might be exacted.
Earlier he advises that
the formulation of naval policy is perhaps best viewed as a fluctuating, intermittent,
triangular struggle, with three main considerations, sometimes in opposition, deter-
mining the decisions. These considerations may be described as domestic, foreign,
and naval.12
The Domestic-Resource Context
In long periods of peace, especially when the character of war is being rapidly al-
tered by new technologies, strategic rationality rarely governs defense policy.
Among the reasons why this should be so is the uncomfortable fact that strategic
need is inherently contestable—whereas, there is by definition a shortage of con-
vincing reality-tests to sort good ideas from bad ideas. Why does the United
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States, with more than a nine-trillion-dollar gross domestic product, spend ap-
proximately $290 billion annually in its Defense Department budget? Is roughly
3 percent of GDP the “correct” resource allocation? Historical scholarship and
common sense tell us that the overall level of U.S. defense expenditure in peace-
time is driven by public mood. For a while, at least, the United States can afford
to spend on defense literally whatever it takes to see off the foe of the moment.
Americans today assuredly could (and almost certainly should) choose to
spend close to $400 billion. But this economic feasibility could be translated into
political demand (voiced by the people’s tribunes in Congress) only by a mood
swing, triggered by a shift in threat
perception. Although the armed
forces, including the Coast Guard,
enjoy high public approval rat-
ings, the nation is not about to
write them a very much larger
check—not, at least, until the
need appears to be demonstrated
by real-world events. Careful de-
fense analysis probably can show
quite plausibly that the country can and should spend that extra hundred billion
a year on national defense, but to advocate as much is to “whistle Dixie,” absent
some indisputable revelation that the military machine is broken or inadequate.
(We won the Cold War and the Gulf War, didn’t we?)
The politics behind U.S. defense expenditure since World War II have pro-
duced an irregular cycle, a “wave train,” of surging and then falling outlays as the
tide of popular alarm has risen and receded.13 If we ignore the direct costs of the
Vietnam War, we find that there have been two surges—one truly great, the
other merely major—in the U.S. defense budget over the past half-century. The
first, a tripling of the DoD budget fueled by the shock of Korea in 1950, allowed
the country to arm properly (and then some) to wage the Cold War seriously.
That was the “wave” that bought the “real Strategic Air Command,” not to men-
tion a nuclear-armed navy and army. The second financially significant “wave”
began to rise in the final year of Jimmy Carter’s presidency and climbed usefully
through and beyond the mid-1980s (the Ronald Reagan years), as plans and
contracts eventually led to actual expenditures.
Great new ventures in U.S. national defense, including candidate revolutions
in military affairs and military technical revolutions, may be conceived in the
lean years between “waves” (think of carrier warfare, amphibious warfare,
long-range bombing, armored warfare);14 to be transformed, however, from
ideas into capabilities they have to catch and ride a “wave.” The Strategic Defense
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Initiative, for example, missed the Reagan budget wave. The United States will
deploy a multilayered ballistic-missile defense architecture on a scale suitable to the
threat only if the idea rides some future swell in the defense-budget wave train.
The budgetary context of the future of the Navy and the Coast Guard, and
particularly the future of their relations, is therefore as follows. First, the defense
budget currently is in the trough between waves; the level is rising, but not sig-
nificantly. (In today’s dollars, the DoD budget has declined from $436 billion in
fiscal 1985 to $291 billion in 2001; the Navy budget has dropped over the same
period from $150 to ninety-plus billion.) Second, there will be a new wave, or
surge, in the budget the next time Americans are persuaded that they face a clear
and present danger. That new wave will very rapidly raise all boats. The lesson of
the early 1950s and early 1980s is that Congress and the White House will want
to fund virtually whatever is ready to be purchased (and, of course, much else
besides). If ballistic-missile defense is arguably ready, or ready enough, it will be
bought on an impressive scale.
If this historically and culturally based argument has merit, it means both
good and bad news for the U.S. Navy. The bad news is that until there is a fairly
dramatic, and self-evident, deterioration in the security environment, ninety to
a hundred billion dollars (in fiscal 2001 currency) will be the politically authori-
tative and enduring support level. It does not much matter who is in the White
House: no administration is going to effect a step-level jump in dollars for the
Defense Department, let alone for the Navy in particular, unless something sig-
nificantly and unexpectedly nasty occurs in the world. The good news, how-
ever—if one dares put it that way—is that the defense budgetary wave train is
assuredly still working. It is a thoroughly safe bet that sometime in the next few
decades the country will decide—probably rapidly and on the basis of scant
strategic analysis—that it must have a much larger, at least more capable, navy.
The political challenge is to be ready to mobilize when the moment arrives and
meanwhile to make such investment as is possible in the $90–$100 billion fleet,
so as to minimize regret later on.
After all, strategic history has a way of delivering crises and wars for which
countries and armed services are less than optimally ready. Recall that the U.S.
Navy was ready for war by late 1943, not 1941–42, and that Hitler’s Kriegsmarine
had been hoping to be “game fit” by 1949, certainly no earlier than 1946. Bartlett
captures the point in his treatment of the Royal Navy after the Napoleonic Wars:
Respect for this principle [to maintain naval supremacy] did not prevent ministers
from living upon “capital” accumulated in the past, from economizing in stores and
new ships in the interest of domestic politics and finance, or from putting the imme-
diate calls upon the Navy before future security. . . . Altogether it is doubtful whether
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any power with a parliamentary constitution, with Britain’s insular position and a
history of territorial inviolability for so many generations, could maintain in time of
peace a fleet prepared in every particular for a large-scale war. The test should not be
perfection but the adequacy of the fleet to deal with an unexpected emergency: not
whether sufficient money and effort had been expended but whether economy had
been pushed too far.15
The Foreign Context
The second context is, confusingly, both a cause and effect of the first. What
Americans allocate to national defense is a function not only of events in the
outside world, the course of international history, but also of the policy they
choose to follow. Foreign policy can age far more rapidly than ships and aircraft.
The new carriers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, Marine weapon systems, or
maritime security cutters that we debate today may well be staple elements of
the national fleet beyond mid-century, meeting the strategic demands of foreign
policy (and domestic policy, for the Coast Guard). But what do we really know
about the “out-decades” of the century we have just entered? Perhaps more to
the point, does it really matter what we do and do not (and cannot) know? Can
we simply register a few grandly sweeping political assumptions about the U.S.
role in the world of tomorrow and then, having checked that box, sail smartly on
to what we find genuinely interesting—a possible revolution in naval affairs,
ship design, network-centricity, the perils of combat in the littoral, and so forth?
Because we are speaking of the future of the Navy and Coast Guard, we must
consider the foreign-policy driver of U.S. defense in a strictly functional way.
Just as naval analysis needs to be contextualized by the perspective of maritime
strategy (a healthy dose of Julian Corbett), so strategy requires a political con-
text.16 Are the Navy and Coast Guard to be so confident in political assumptions
about the future of world politics and the U.S. role (and derivative missions)
therein as, in effect, to regard foreign policy as a given? We have characterized
domestic-resource context as an irregular wave train, with occasional great and
not-so-great budgetary surges, triggered by the ringing of security alarms.
Can the Navy shape long-term acquisition programs (such as the DD 21) with
only generic foes in mind? Surely, distinctive geopolitics might imply distinctive
geostrategy (for instance, China’s strategic geography is dramatically different
from Russia’s). If so, defense planners today should have no difficulty ac-
knowledging, at least in principle, that the relative importance of naval power in
joint warfare should vary with the identity, and hence geography, of the enemy;
and that the utility of different kinds of naval capabilities should vary with
the character of combat specific to adversaries and places. Geography does mat-
ter.17 It may have seemed to be overridden when U.S. naval power reached into
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landlocked Afghanistan in 1998 to try to touch a rogue among rogues, but as a
strategic enterprise the exercise was not entirely satisfactory. Technology is not
synonymous with strategic effect.
Some of the contemporary speculation about the future of the U.S. Navy is
highly intriguing but deeply flawed—specifically, by apparent unfamiliarity
with the enduring lore of global strategy. Jan Breemer, a leader of the “Monterey
school,” for example, argues that “naval strategy is dead,” while others note that
ours is a “golden age of United States sea power.”18 On the first assertion, one
might be moved to quote Mark Twain’s wry comment that reports of his death
were greatly exaggerated; as for the second, all golden ages without exception
fade and pass away. Characteristically, golden ages bear the seeds of their own
demise. They glitter most brilliantly when they have already endured many years
and seem likely to endure for many more—but are in fact nearing dissolution.
The Navy Strategic Planning Guidance records that “the Navy assumes that no
peer competitor on a global scale will arise prior to 2020.”19 That assumption is
probably correct, though the qualifying phrase “on a global scale”
merits watching. Nonetheless, consideration of the foreign and
the (nonnaval) maritime (see below) contexts of the twenty-first
century reduces confidence in the “golden age” argument. There
are at least two torpedoes in the water racing to destroy that view.
First, the whole history and logic of international relations tells us
that the United States will not be permitted to exercise unchal-
lenged a benign hegemony on behalf of the existing global “or-
der.” One may attempt to argue that the present course of events shows a
profound transformation away from the dangerous competitive practices of the
past, but the evidence is weak and assuredly inconclusive.20 Second, and as a stra-
tegically logical corollary to the first point, it would be absurd to suggest that the
greater among America’s enemies in this new century will concede, without con-
test, to U.S. sea power—writ large, the right to use the seas at will. It is about as
prudent a thing to suggest today as it would have been in 1815.
Let us be crystal clear: If it continues to be important, indeed vital, that the
United States be able to use the seas for commercial and military purposes, then
its rivals and enemies must inevitably be motivated to contest that ability—di-
rectly or indirectly, symmetrically or asymmetrically. Little comfort should be
drawn from the fact that the U.S. Navy is currently the “last man standing.” Re-
sources, time, and strength of political motivation will find a way to challenge
that status. Mahan was as correct for 1890 as he was for 1990, and prospectively
for 2090, when he wrote, “Notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dan-
gers of the sea, both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and
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cheaper than by land.”21 Whatever technological erosion Mahan’s claim has suf-
fered with the passage of 110 years has been only marginal.
Of course, the U.S. Navy is not opposed today by any other navy with
global pretensions. But that is not a profound, or even particularly significant,
observation. The most basic reason for this “golden age” of U.S. maritime com-
mand is eminently temporary: world politics has been shaking down from the
Cold War, is in an interwar period of uncertain duration, and no polity or coali-
tion now existing has both the political incentive and the readily mobilizable
base to challenge the U.S. maritime imperium. The Navy Strategic Planning
Guidance makes its claim only to the year 2020. It is highly improbable
(though not inconceivable) either that the United States will be permitted to
enjoy a Second American Century untroubled by serious competition or that a
major foe, probably a coalition of foes, will be content to concede the high seas
as a sanctuary and highway for such commercial and military activity as the
United States chooses to conduct. The current understandable focus on operat-
ing “from the sea,” “forward from the sea,” and even “beyond the sea” should not
lead to a self-indulgently static view of the future of international politics.
American defense theorists have to avoid intellectual capture by the “grammar”
of contemporary military affairs at the expense of longer-range strategic thought
that is properly contextualized politically.22
Let us close this part of the discussion with a historically based caveat for
those susceptible to “golden age” fallacies. Such errors misled both the imperial
Athenians and Britons, and they have induced others, like the continentalist
Spartans and Germans, to acquire fleets (leading the latter to a strategically un-
successful outcome).23 In this century, the greater among America’s foes are not
likely to concede all operations in the entire maritime realm beyond coastal wa-
ters to the authority of the U.S. Navy. This brings us to the inherently contestable
military context of guesswork about future warfare.
The Military Context
Navy–Coast Guard relations in the framework of the national-fleet concept have
to be shaped, in their military aspects, principally by the military future of the
Navy. That future has implications for the Coast Guard, but national defense is
only one among the roles of that service. We have to be careful lest in a search for
cost-effective complementarities between Navy and Coast Guard we underplay
the vital point that the first duty of the latter is excellence as a coast guard. If the
U.S. government decided, foolishly, that the overriding job for the Coast Guard
was to assist the Navy, it would be sensible to fold the Coast Guard wholly into
the larger service.
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The U.S. Navy takes its tune, or at least should, from control (even command)
of the high seas. Evolution in the grammar of sea war, and of war generally, will
from time to time suggest shifts in
emphasis among subsurface, sur-
face, air, space, and indeed
land-based naval assets. What is
significant as a matter of broad
guidance for planning, however,
is that the first duty of a navy, in
this case the premier navy, is to
control sea lines of communica-
tion—to allow or deny access to
the sea, thence across it, and fi-
nally to the land, where humankind lives.24 Whether or not today we judge it
probable that any foe of the United States will try to build a high-seas fleet over
the next half-century that might mount a challenge for maritime command,
thereby hazarding a Trafalgar or Midway, is not at all the point. The true point is
that the more powerful of the nation’s foes in the future are certain—yes, cer-
tain—to need ways to defeat or sideline the U.S. Navy. Much as the European
Nato members were always unenthusiastic in the Cold War about strategies
geared to “win” a war, as if on points, in Europe, so America’s enemies would
prefer to do more than just deny to U.S. military power their own littorals. So-
phisticated fortress design usually included outworks, to act as attriting and dis-
tracting breakwaters. Contemporary China, for example, like imperial Japan
before it, understands the concept of area denial very well indeed.
The military context for the U.S. national fleet comprises so rich a set of
topics that it can be treated here only in summary fashion. First of all, the great
RMA debate of the 1990s is over. By historical analogy, it is in the condition
reached in the nuclear debate by the early 1960s: the debaters are out of fresh
inspiration; the intellectual offerings have become overelaborate; the real world
of strategic history has provided little new stimulus; and antithesis has done its
work, leading to some synthesis. Scholars differ on whether an information-led
RMA is a seismic military revolution, meaning a wave to be ridden but not
directed, or merely a military technical revolution, to be “made” by dedicated
revolutionaries in the face of atavistic forces. We must not forget that these terms
are no more than the conceptual inventions of imaginative people; we should
not take them too seriously. Competent theorists always can invent and deploy
exciting-sounding concepts to explain the necessity for the navy they prefer. The
RMA family of ideas is inherently biased in favor of the novel. Also, it is worth
noting that the recently advertised “revolution in naval affairs” has less to do with
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believe that 305 ships are not likely to be
enough in the future.
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military science than with a political reality: that the (somewhat) blue-water
Soviet naval challenge to U.S. maritime superiority was terminated by radical
change in its domestic political context.
Second, a U.S. Navy planning “to boldly go” (to use a split infinitive institu-
tionalized by a famous television series) where great navies have feared to sail,
into coastal waters—at least to operate forward from, and beyond, the sea—needs
to be alert to a logical paradox of conflict that Edward N. Luttwak has all but
made his own.25 In the same way that a United States apparently omnicompetent
in conventional warfare motivates enemies to find, if they can, asymmetrical
strategic “equalizers” (such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and po-
litical warfare), so a U.S. Navy shaped significantly for littoral warfare should ex-
pect foes to investigate other regions in which to seek its embarrassment.
Third, whether in coastal waters or on the high seas, the navy of a superpower
that aspires to protect commerce and international order globally has no re-
sponsible choice other than to pursue excellence virtually wherever military
science takes it, however serendipitously. (Remember the trireme;26 recall HMS
Dreadnought and then Queen Elizabeth.) Athens and Britain had
structurally similar problems in translating naval strength into
strategic advantage, but they were both entirely sound in policies
of maritime supremacy.27 Such supremacy alone did not ensure
their security—which is why we read Corbett as well as
Mahan—but it was the keystone of their strategies.28 The U.S.
Navy in the twenty-first century, following Pericles and Jackie
(properly, Admiral Sir John) Fisher, has to be and remain unarguably
“second to none.” In an important sense, it does not fashion itself to defeat the
navies of today’s (absent) enemies; rather does it plan to control the sea, and es-
pecially the high seas—failing which any discussion of littoral warfare is strictly
moot—against all comers, in all combinations, and with any style of combat.
Politically and strategically, this is the nature and character of the U.S. Navy with
which the Coast Guard must cooperate in a national fleet.
Fourth, twenty-year expectations should not drive forty-year capabilities.
The current naval debate is pervaded with some doubtful orthodoxies that are
probably just plausible fallacies. For example: naval strategy is dead; naval
warfare is now just warfare, not even an especially distinctive category of it, and
accordingly naval vessels are simply vehicles more or less interchangeable and
competitive with those based on land (or in space); and blue water is “American”
by history’s definitive strategic verdict. Perhaps victory in three great wars
(two hot, one cold) prompts this supposition. Unfortunately, the most recent
victory—all but an accident in geopolitical and geostrategic terms (the demise
of the erstwhile other superstate)—is being interpreted as a lasting condition in
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its naval implications.29 Devotees of the proposition that the high seas are per-
manently American should ask themselves on what basis they judge themselves
superior in predictive talent to the statesmen of the 1920s who failed to foresee
the 1930s, or of the 1970s and early 1980s who missed the grand Soviet collapse
of 1989–91.
Finally, technological change drives tactics, shapes operational art, and can
imply strategy. However, certain inherent strengths and limitations of sea power,
and naval power, have proved remarkably resilient in the face of technological,
social, economic, and political change. The demise of navies has been much an-
ticipated but appears no more imminent today than it was half a century ago. In
fact, as Sam Tangredi has argued (and we will suggest in the maritime context),
current trends in globalization are augmenting, not shrinking, the relative im-
portance of sea power in general, and therefore of navies and coast guards in
particular.30 Modern military science has not so homogenized military affairs
that physical geography is strictly yesterday’s dimension of war and strategy.
Ships can loiter menacingly as no other form of military power can. The (admit-
tedly expensive) self-defending, mobile airfield that is a fleet carrier (and its es-
corts) means—to paraphrase the tag line of a once-famous 1970 movie—never
having to say one is sorry to, ask political permission from, or consult the sensi-
tivities of, a local friend.
Of course, there is much that the Navy and Marine Corps cannot do, or can-
not do well—as both are continually reminded by the Army and Air Force as
well. That, we must add, is one reason why there is a U.S. Coast Guard. We can il-
luminate with a four-way discriminator what each of the four environmentally
specific services—and, distinctively, the Coast Guard—brings to the banquet in
contrast to the Navy. We ask:
• What each can do uniquely
• What each can do well
• What each tends to do poorly
• What each cannot do at all.
As best one can tell—and the historical evidence is truly impressive—naval
power is in no danger whatsoever of being overtaken by a technological, or any
other, revolution. Mahan and Corbett are classics not only of sea power but also
of strategy. Much of their explanation of the strategic utility of navies and of sea
power is as valid today as it was a century ago.
The (Nonnaval) Maritime Context
The three contexts discussed thus far have leaned heavily toward consideration
of the future of the Navy in the national fleet alliance. The fourth context shifts
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the focus to the Coast Guard. It so happens that we can be as certain about trends
in the nonnaval uses of the sea, and therefore in the demand for distinctively
coast-guarding services, as we are necessarily uncertain about the major prob-
lems that could test the Navy in combat. The guesswork involved in naval plan-
ning is nearly absent from forecasts bearing upon the Coast Guard—because the
primary focus of the service is not the national defense duties legally laid upon it
but marine safety, maritime law enforcement, and marine environmental pro-
tection. Whatever (say) China attempts, the U.S. Coast Guard will have to try to
cope with an expanding domain and the growing severity of challenges in its
unique role as the country’s policeman at sea (and on shore). What do we know
about the future of non-national-defense demands upon the Coast Guard?
The pressure on America’s maritime frontier is increasing and will continue
to increase.31 It ranges from a huge foreseeable growth—probably a tripling—in
the volume of legitimate maritime trade by 2020 (95 percent of U.S. exports and
imports now move by sea); a boom in illegal migration by sea; an increase in
marine drug smuggling; and greater demands on the resources of the sea, in-
cluding fisheries and mineral deposits. The general picture of growth is clear
enough. Those who guard the maritime approaches know that more and more is
required of them, aside from their also-growing list of defense-related duties.
The bare statistics on Coast Guard activity are awe inspiring. The American
public is reminded of the Coast Guard when a white hull with the orange and
blue stripes is seen in the context of an air crash at sea or the interception of a
boat with illegal drugs or immigrants. The big picture, however, is
that the service responds each year to approximately fifty thou-
sand distress calls, saves perhaps five thousand lives outright, and
provides help to a hundred thousand other people in emergen-
cies. Every year, roughly eight hundred Americans lose their lives
in marine accidents. Seventy-eight million Americans a year now
use recreational vessels, a figure predicted to rise by 65 percent
over the next twenty years. Relatedly, cruise ship fleets will double
in that period; individual vessels will carry five or six thousand people and dis-
place up to 142,000 tons, fifty thousand more than the carrier Nimitz. Consider
the sheer scale of another key current Coast Guard activity: each year the service
conducts safety inspections of thirty-four thousand U.S. vessels, nineteen thou-
sand foreign vessels, and seven thousand fixed marine facilities on and off shore.
The relevant trends are almost entirely in the direction of heavier burdens,
and the reasons are all but self-evident. For one, the world’s population is likely
to expand by a staggering two billion by 2020. For another, the United States is
a giant economy (nine trillion-plus dollars) with gigantic maritime responsibil-
ities, including guardianship of the world’s largest offshore exclusive economic
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zone (or EEZ, at 3.36 million square miles); U.S. economic performance is
critically dependent on the high seas and its own coastal and internal waterways.
Everywhere we look we find an increase in pressure on marine resources and, of
course, on those charged with their protection. For just one example, fisheries
law-enforcement boardings by the Coast Guard increased from 9,440 in 1994 to
14,173 in 1998. No fewer than twenty-six thousand commercial fishing boats
operate in U.S. waters. The context of pressure on the Coast Guard, in fact, most
vividly emerges from the juncture of these two factors: the predicted growth in
world population translates to an annual demand for perhaps 110 million tons
of protein from fish, while only eighty-two million is likely to be prudently
harvestable. It follows that the Coast Guard, charged with protecting the world’s
largest EEZ, with 20 percent of the world’s estimated fish resources, is going to
be kept very busy.
The litany goes on. The next twenty years will see an expansion of oil imports
(by sea, of course) to the United States, from today’s 40 percent of domestic con-
sumption to 66 percent of an even larger total demand. There will be more ship-
ping, larger and faster ships with smaller crews, and many more people taking
their leisure on, and traveling (by ferry) through, U.S. ports and waters. With re-
gard to drug traffic, for example, at least 70 percent of the total drug flow into the
United States now travels part of the way by sea.
The fact is that each of the three segments of the Coast Guard’s portfo-
lio—justice, transportation, and defense—is registering noticeable growth. The
service, uniquely, is responsible for law enforcement at sea (being the only
armed service exempt from the restrictions of posse comitatus), leads in marine
safety in all respects, and has a noteworthy clutch of maritime defense assign-
ments. Therefore the significance to the nation of the Coast Guard is in effect
that of the sea itself. Only those who do not appreciate how vital is the sea to the
safety, prosperity, and well-being of the United States will find difficulty in un-
derstanding why an obsolescing Coast Guard matters deeply.
A NATIONAL FLEET
As noted at the beginning of this article, the Navy has entered the new century
perilously thin in numbers of surface warships, a condition currently pro-
grammed to worsen markedly. Pessimistic projections show as few as ninety
ships (all “high-end”) by 2020. The service has descended in a decade from a
total of 592 ships to 316 today and is headed below three hundred. But times
alter needs. The Navy has looked hard at what it may require to enforce access
from the sea through the coastal waters of enemies, and it has unsurprisingly
concluded that numbers matter.
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Today the service is examining ways to square the circle—how it can increase
the number of its surface combatants while carrying through a revolution in
ship propulsion (integrated electric drive, which enthusiasts claim should prove
as significant as the shift in the nineteenth century from sail to steam), all
without breaking the bank.32 The much discussed, though as yet little endorsed,
STREETFIGHTER concept of small but highly competent coastal warships is a
notable sign of the times.33 By the Navy’s own sensible admission, the plainly
predictable scarcity of surface warships and attack submarines threatens the in-
tegrity of policy and strategy. Mean, potent STREETFIGHTERs may or may not be
part of the strategic solution, but the thirty-five to forty maritime security cut-
ters that the Coast Guard plans to acquire over the next twenty years have to be.
The present high and medium-endurance cutters, patrol aircraft, and com-
munications systems of the Coast Guard are generally old, becoming obsoles-
cent, and in some regards already inadequate. In the apposite words of the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral James M. Loy, “Our
ships and aircraft that operate offshore are among the oldest of all
the world’s fleets of similar platforms—38th of 41. The personnel
and maintenance costs of keeping these ancient craft running
grow increasingly prohibitive.”34 The point is not that obsolescent
equipment cannot do as good a job as more modern equip-
ment—that is obvious—but that it will increasingly be unable to
do the job at all. Smuggling craft, for example, already outrun or
otherwise evade Coast Guard vessels, and their radar cross sections defeat the
old search radars on the cutters. Similarly, the maintenance problems of aging
ships and aircraft affect endurance on station, especially far from shore.35
The need to recapitalize the deep-water assets of the U.S. Coast Guard draws
urgency, then, both from the ever-more-challenging scale and quality of tradi-
tional coast-guarding tasks and from the need to operate effectively with the
other U.S. armed services. The sharpness of this problem has been highlighted
usefully by the Coast Guard’s Assistant Commandant for Operations, Rear
Admiral Ray Riutta. He confides that “the biggest challenge I have . . . is to make
sure that I do not field assets that are so slow, defenseless, and technologically
outdated as to be albatrosses around the necks of the Navy’s forces with which
we sail.” 36 To underfund (as today) the Coast Guard while its duties expand is to
produce an entirely predictable result: its equipment and people are worked
harder than is wise; retention, equipment life, and readiness rates suffer; and a
crisis gathers.
To sustain operational tempo in the near term, spare parts are cannibalized
from working equipment. That practice is now standard for the Coast Guard’s
fleet of thirty C-130s. Some planes are kept flying, but at the cost of reducing an
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already lean force structure, demoralizing overworked personnel, and lowering
retention rates of experienced service members. (Between 1994 and 1999, the
availability of Coast Guard C-130s dropped from 80 percent to an unacceptable
60 percent.) Cannibalization means that at least one of the aircraft assigned to
each of the Coast Guard’s five air stations is likely to be a “hangar queen.” These
planes, of course, are in no sense “extra”; stripping them for parts means patrols
not conducted or backup not available; the consequence can be lives needlessly
lost at sea and laws not properly enforced. The issue is easy to explain. Admiral
Loy simply states the facts when he says: “The unfavorable trends in aircraft
availability, parts inventories, and crew experience challenge our ability to provide
mariners in distress with the rescue services Americans have come to expect.”37
The national security community typically shows as little interest in the Coast
Guard as did the Clinton administration (understandably, the jury is out on the
Bush administration).38 Many of the problems described here lend themselves to
elementary and inexpensive solution. Again to quote Admiral Loy, speaking on
the same occasion, “Many of our readiness issues are the sort of problems that
really can be solved by throwing money at them. Twelve or thirteen million dol-
lars to restore our parts inventories to where they were a few years ago would be a
nice place to start.” Both intellectually and financially the Coast Guard operates
beneath the notice of most political leaders. In 1998 the White House ap-
proached Congress for an emergency supplemental budget augmentation to im-
prove the readiness of the armed forces. The administration’s request did “not
include a nickel for the Coast Guard,” even though the service had participated
in its development and shared the readiness problems of all the other services.39
It would be a serious mistake to assume that the crisis described may produce,
at worst, a graceful degradation of performance—“merely” more lives lost at sea,
more pollution not prevented or punished, more drugs brought in by “go-fast”
boats, and more fish stocks illegally run down.40 A persistently underresourced,
aging Coast Guard could also mean large and exceedingly unhappy events: an-
other Exxon Valdez disaster, a super–cruise ship aided too late, or a nuclear de-
vice transported by sea undetected into the United States.
Aside from all this, the Coast Guard has to be ready to place itself in harm’s
way in active war zones. It is not the mission of the service to win and keep con-
trol of the sea; that is the job of the Navy. However, the Coast Guard does have to be
able to operate seamlessly with the Navy and the other armed services. As the
Navy heads for mastery of information-led network-centric warfare, it must
help the Coast Guard to function within that framework.41 The C4ISR regime
needs to be common to all of America’s services, not just a “high-tech” four.
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The emerging picture is one of national security under increasing stress at
sea. The Defense Department and the Navy admit—in the national fleet “treaty”
signed with the Coast Guard—that the fleet is too small and that accordingly
the Coast Guard has to reequip itself for duties farther offshore.42 Forty-one
deep-water cutters were a useful adjunct to the (almost) six-hundred-ship Navy
of the 1980s. Today, as the Navy copes with austerity and technical revolution by
concentrating its capabilities in fewer ships, optimized for high-intensity con-
flict, those cutters assume a new significance. By 2020, the Navy will have no frig-
ates left, and all its destroyers will be large and expensive. There will be no small,
general-purpose warships—a yawning void between the fourteen Cyclone-class
(PC 1) patrol boats on the one hand and the fifty-seven Arleigh Burkes and the
new DD 21s on the other.43 This trend could change in the future, particularly if
the service pursues some variant of the STREETFIGHTER coastal warship, but
certainly it is not going to change rapidly. The Navy intends to replace no fewer
than eighty-eight Oliver Hazard Perry frigates and Spruance destroyers with
thirty-two DD 21s (really mini–Arsenal Ships, close in concept to the monitors
of yesteryear), beginning with the first DD 21 in 2008 and about three ships a
year thereafter. By 2020, as noted already, Navy surface warships might well
number scarcely more than ninety.
The interconnecting parts of the compounding maritime crisis, however,
suggest a workable solution. For once, the law of unintended consequences
should work in favor of U.S. national security. If the Navy expects to be short of,
or even lack entirely, frigate-like warships of the future, the Coast Guard can
help fill the gap; it need only reequip itself in a way that it ought to anyway for
the better conduct of nondefense duties. The concept is that of a national fleet:
the idea that the Navy and Coast Guard are complementary and synergistic, that
they are especially cost-effective when yoked in tandem.
The concept is bureaucratically new, but it is well established in historical
practice; no break with law or tradition is contemplated. The Coast Guard is le-
gally an armed service, and its cutters have always been more or less well-armed,
shallow-draft warships.44 The question is how much “war” equipment Coast
Guard warships should be capable of carrying. That question has yet to be
answered in detail, but as a matter of guiding principle it is answerable today;
indeed, the agreed concept of the national fleet settles the most pertinent issue.
In political fact, of course, matters are not so simple. At present the Coast Guard
must compete within the Department of Transportation for respect and dollars;
within the administration for provision within the balanced budget; and in the
face of a Navy all too willing to offer cast-off equipment (frequently overage and
therefore expensive to maintain, crew, and operate; or otherwise excellent craft
like the Cyclones, inappropriate for the Coast Guard’s blue-water tasks).
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The zone of reasonable disagreement about the Coast Guard’s duties and
equipment is not extensive. There is no uniquely right number of Coast Guard
cutters, no unquestionably correct timetable for their replacement, and cer-
tainly no unarguably optimal equipment for them. Probably it is
intelligent to think about a flexible, mixed fleet of deep-water
cutters, perhaps with “plug-in” capabilities. Not all cutters would
be available for combat zones, though obviously the more that are
equipped to survive in a hostile environment—at least under the
wings of other armed forces—the better. Also, the sea services
need not decide soon and definitively precisely how “warship-like”
new cutters should be. What matters is that cutters and aircraft be
so designed that modular adjustments of combat power can be effected as re-
quired over operating lifetimes that could extend into the second half of the cen-
tury, and that Coast Guard C4ISR allow interoperability with all the other
services.45
All of this brings us to the only point in the argument not extensively sup-
ported thus far—that the Coast Guard, as an armed service, should seriously
consider a move to the Department of Defense. The case can be put negatively or
positively, and it is quite persuasive either way. The negative argument empha-
sizes the increasingly poor fit of the Coast Guard in the Department of Trans-
portation. Too many of its missions and tasks—aside from safety of maritime
passage, a core concern of the Coast Guard—lie far outside the charter, interests,
and even culture, of Transportation. This is not a criticism of that department
but an acknowledgment that the Coast Guard and its current administrative
parent have evolved in different directions.
The positive argument for relocation to Defense is that America’s security en-
vironment increasingly requires the four armed services in that department to
operate against irregular and unconventional foes. At the same time, the varied
missions of the Coast Guard are requiring it to equip for, and perform, opera-
tions more military in nature. Whatever may have been the case in the past, the
total job of the Coast Guard today is more complementary to those of the other
armed services than it is to the Department of Transportation.
None of this denies the uniqueness of the Coast Guard among the armed ser-
vices. As noted earlier, it is exempted from posse comitatus, and it is the federal
policing agency at sea and on the coasts. Coast Guard people are lightly armed
military professionals, many of whose tasks are notably nonmilitary (ship in-
spection, port safety, marine resource protection, safety of navigation, and so
forth). However, an unmistakable practical convergence is under way: the Coast
Guard’s defense mission is growing, while the national security agenda of inter-
est to the Defense Department is widening.
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
21
Gray: The Coast Guard and Navy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Of course, there would be problems for the Coast Guard within Defense.
However, the difficulties look distinctly manageable; they should be dwarfed by
the advantages. The Coast Guard probably cannot fit snugly into the Defense
Department (or anywhere else), but it can fit well enough there, provided the
problems are understood and addressed. For instance, the essential recapitaliza-
tion of the Coast Guard must meet distinctive Coast Guard operational needs; it
must also capture complementarities and synergisms with the Navy. That would
surely be easier to arrange within Defense than from outside. The material and
strategic advantages, in general, could be huge. In Defense, the Coast Guard would
be perceived and treated as what it truly is, the country’s fifth armed service.
Further, it would be able to participate more effectively in logistical, procure-
ment, and personnel arrangements. Recent, indeed current, experience makes
plain that the skilled people who are the Coast Guard increasingly suffer adverse
disparities with respect to Defense Department personnel in benefits and allow-
ances (though not pay). This fifth armed service has to try to recruit and retain
professionals in competition with other services better able to look after their
people; as it is, the Coast Guard can make up the difference only by siphoning
money out of the equipment and operating budgets. In the Defense Depart-
ment, the Coast Guard’s people would be treated as what they are, members of
the U.S. armed forces.
The risks in all this are not trivial, but neither are they truly daunting.
Above all else, a Coast Guard within DoD would need to preserve its distinctive
warrior-policeman culture. There would be some areas of disagreement with
other services. For example, it is probable that the Coast Guard’s expanding role
as guardian of marine resources would fuel tension with the Navy, whose
priorities have been rather different.46 So be it: America needs both perspectives.
There is every reason to be optimistic that the service could retain its (some-
what) policeman-like reputation and yet function, and be seen to function, as
a full member of the armed forces team. Perhaps a civilian assistant secretary of
defense for the Coast Guard would be useful in achieving that balance.
Alternatives such as relocation to the Justice Department or conversion to
something like the Federal Emergency Management Agency are interesting, and
the arguments for them have merit, but they do not yet compete seriously with
the Defense option. Looking to the decades ahead, the Coast Guard inevitably
will be more of an armed service with a difference than a maritime police force
with a difference. At the least, it is time for this subject to be aired publicly.
The dominant conclusion is that the Navy and the Coast Guard are natural com-
plements and that this complementarity should be expressed practically in a
“national fleet” that is not mere rhetoric. It is surely beyond argument that the
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Navy cannot often afford to devote exceedingly scarce (and frighteningly expen-
sive) assets to operations other than war. For its part, the Coast Guard, limping
along on between four and five billion dollars per annum, could not take up
naval—which is to say war-fighting—duties even if it so wished (which it does
not). Even the next great surge in the defense budget (ideally by that time includ-
ing the Coast Guard), which would presumably put the Navy back in the frigate
business, would not promote serious difficulty vis-à-vis the Coast Guard. A
rising budgetary tide would raise all boats—gray hulls and orange stripes.
If—realistically, when—the American public becomes alarmed once again about
defense, both the Navy and the Coast Guard (for its national-defense duties)
assuredly will be bolstered.
Those who have the leisure to read history and strategic theory, and who are
not immersed in the short-term issues and crises of government, have a duty to
try to sort the enduring from the ephemeral. Officials lack the time (and, having
chosen to be officials, probably the inclination) for such reflection. The whole
subject of Navy–Coast Guard relations is in need of just such conceptual,
strategic, and historical contextualization. In the heat, excitement, and urgen-
cies of interservice issues, with their large budgetary ramifications, significant
truths can slip out of sight. One is that, like the Athenian and British navies of
the past, the U.S. Navy has an international “ordering” function that obliges it to
dominate the most demanding possible conflict. The Navy is therefore prudent
in investing in naval supremacy on the high seas, even though no plausible com-
petitor is in view today.
Some concepts du jour hide their real obsolescence behind fashionable buzz-
words, novel-seeming theories of future warfare, and mood swings, either opti-
mistic or pessimistic. Donald and Frederick W. Kagan deftly skewer one such
flawed view:
The absence of “global peer competitors” does not make the world safe for the
foreseeable future—it only makes it uncertain and difficult to understand. When
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 it was not a “global peer competitor.” Nor was
Germany in either world war. Still less was North Korea in 1950, North Vietnam in
the 1960’s, Saddam Hussein in 1990, or Slobodan Milosevic in 1999 when they un-
leashed attacks that compelled American military intervention. None of these states
posed an imminent threat to the continental United States. The concept of “global
peer competitors” is the thinking of the Cold War and is not relevant to debates
about future American national strategy.47
When the nation considers carefully the domestic, foreign, and military
contexts of Navy–Coast Guard relations, much that is uncertain can be settled.
The proposition that the sea services of the United States should behave as
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complementary parts of a national fleet is true to their several natures and func-
tions. It need not provoke controversy.
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